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Abstract
Machine learning models are prone to memorizing sensitive
data, making them vulnerable to membership inference at-
tacks in which an adversary aims to guess if an input sample
was used to train the model. In this paper, we show that prior
work on membership inference attacks may severely underes-
timate the privacy risks by relying solely on training custom
neural network classifiers to perform attacks and focusing
only on the aggregate results over data samples, such as the at-
tack accuracy. To overcome these limitations, we first propose
to benchmark membership inference privacy risks by improv-
ing existing non-neural network based inference attacks and
proposing a new inference attack method based on a modifi-
cation of prediction entropy. We also propose benchmarks for
defense mechanisms by accounting for adaptive adversaries
with knowledge of the defense and also accounting for the
trade-off between model accuracy and privacy risks. Using
our benchmark attacks, we demonstrate that existing defense
approaches against membership inference attacks are not as
effective as previously reported.
Next, we introduce a new approach for fine-grained privacy
analysis by formulating and deriving a new metric called the
privacy risk score. Our privacy risk score metric measures an
individual sample’s likelihood of being a training member,
which allows an adversary to perform membership inference
attacks with high confidence. We experimentally validate the
effectiveness of the privacy risk score metric and demonstrate
that the distribution of the privacy risk score across individual
samples is heterogeneous. Finally, we perform an in-depth
investigation for understanding why certain samples have
high privacy risk scores, including correlations with model
properties such as model sensitivity, generalization error, and
feature embeddings. Our work emphasizes the importance
of a systematic and rigorous evaluation of privacy risks of
machine learning models.
1 Introduction
A recent thread of research has shown that machine learning
(ML) models memorize sensitive information of training data,
indicating serious privacy risks [4,9,10,15,35,39,40]. In this
paper, we focus on the membership inference attack, where
the adversary aims to guess whether an input sample was
used to train the target machine learning model or not [39,47].
It poses a severe privacy risk as the membership can reveal
an individual’s sensitive information [3, 33]. For example,
participation in a hospital’s health analytic training set means
that an individual was once a patient in that hospital. Shokri
et al. [39] conducted membership inference attacks against
machine learning classifiers in the black-box manner, where
the adversary only observes prediction outputs of the target
model. They formalize the attack as a classification problem
and train dedicated neural network (NN) classifiers to dis-
tinguish between training members and non-members. The
research community has since extended the idea of member-
ship inference attacks to generative models [7, 12, 14, 45], to
differentially private models [18,34], to decentralized settings
where the models are trained across multiple users without
sharing their data [28,30], and to white-box settings where the
adversary also has the access to the target model’s architecture
and weights [30].
To mitigate such privacy risks, several defenses against
membership inference attacks have been proposed. Nasr et
al. [29] propose to include membership inference attacks
during the training process: they train the target model to
simultaneously achieve correct predictions and low member-
ship inference attack accuracy by adding the inference attack
as an adversarial regularization term. Jia et al. [19] propose
a defense method called MemGuard which does not require
retraining the model: the model prediction outputs are obfus-
cated with noisy perturbations such that the adversary cannot
distinguish between members and non-members based on
the perturbed outputs. Both papers show that their defenses
greatly mitigate membership inference privacy risks, resulting
in attack performance that is close to random guessing.
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In this paper, we critically examine how previous work
[19,29,30,36,39,44] has evaluated the membership inference
privacy risks of machine learning models, and demonstrate
two key limitations that lead to a severe underestimation of
privacy risks. First, many prior papers, particularly those
proposing defense methods [19, 29], solely rely on training
custom NN classifiers to perform membership inference at-
tacks. These NN attack classifiers may underestimate privacy
risks due to inappropriate settings of hyperparameters such as
number of hidden layers and learning rate. Second, existing
evaluations only focus on aggregate notions of privacy risks
faced by all data samples, lacking a fine-grained understand-
ing of privacy risks faced by individual samples.
To overcome the limitation of reliance on NN-based at-
tacks, we propose to use a suite of alternative existing and
novel attack methods to benchmark the membership infer-
ence privacy risks. These benchmark attack methods make
inference decisions based on computing custom metrics on
the predictions of the target model. We also show that rigor-
ously benchmarking defense mechanisms requires a careful
consideration of strategic adversaries aware of the defense
mechanism, as well as alternative baselines that trade-off accu-
racy of the target machine learning model with privacy risks.
With our proposed benchmark attacks, we indeed find that
that existing membership inference defense methods [19, 29]
are not as effective as previously reported. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, the adversary can still perform membership inference
attacks on models defended by adversarial regularization [29]
and MemGuard [19] with an accuracy ranging from 58.6% to
74.2%, instead of the reported accuracy around 50%, which
is the accuracy of random guessing. Therefore, we argue that
these non-NN based attacks should supplement existing NN
based attacks to effectively measure the privacy risks.
Table 1: Benchmarking the effectiveness of existing defenses
[19, 29] against membership inference attacks. Both Nasr et
al. [29] and Jia et al. [19] report that for their defended models,
custom NN classifiers achieve attack accuracy close to 50%,
which is the accuracy of random guessing. By using a suite
of non-NN based attacks as our benchmark, we find that the
attack accuracy is significantly larger than previous estimates,
ranging from an increase of 7.6% to 23.9%.
defense methods dataset reported our benchmarkattack acc attack acc
Purchase100 51.6% 59.5%adversarial
regularization [29] Texas100 51.0% 58.6%
MemGuard [19]
Location30 50.1% 69.1%
Texas100 50.3% 74.2%
To overcome the limitation of a lack of understanding of
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of privacy risk scores for
undefended models trained on Purchase100, Location30, and
CIFAR100 datasets.
fine-grained privacy risks in existing works, we propose a
new metric called the privacy risk score, that represents an in-
dividual sample’s probability of being a member in the target
model’s training set. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distri-
butions of privacy risk scores on target undefended models
trained on Purchase100, Location30, and CIFAR100 datasets
respectively. We can see that the privacy risk faced by individ-
ual training samples is heterogeneous. By utilizing the privacy
risk score, an adversary can perform membership inference
attacks with high confidence: an input sample is inferred as
a member if and only if its privacy risk score is higher than
a certain threshold value. Overall, we recommend that our
per-sample privacy risk analysis should be used in conjunc-
tion with existing aggregate privacy analysis for an in-depth
understanding of privacy risks of machine learning models.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. We propose a suite of non-NN based attacks to bench-
mark target models’ privacy risks by improving existing
attacks with class-specific threshold settings and design-
ing a new inference attack based on a modified predic-
tion entropy estimation in a manner that incorporates
the ground truth class label. Furthermore, to rigorously
evaluate the performance of membership inference de-
fenses, we make recommendations for comparison with
early stopping baseline and considering adaptive attack-
ers with knowledge of defense mechanisms.
2. With our benchmark attacks, we find that two state-of-
the-art defense approaches [19, 29] are not as effective
as previously reported. Furthermore, we observe that the
defense performance of adversarial regularization [29] is
no better than early stopping, and the evaluation of Mem-
Guard [19] lacks a consideration of adaptive adversaries.
We also find that the existing white-box attacks [30] have
limited advantages over our benchmark attacks, which
only need black-box access to the target model. We also
show that our attacks with class-specific threshold set-
tings strictly outperform attacks with class-independent
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thresholds, and our new inference attack based on modi-
fied prediction entropy strictly outperforms conventional
prediction entropy based attack.
3. We propose to analyze privacy risks of machine learning
models in a fine-grained manner by focusing on individ-
ual samples. We define a new metric called the privacy
risk score, that estimates an individual sample’s proba-
bility of being in the target model’s training set.
4. We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our
new metric in being able to capture the likelihood of
an individual sample being a training member. We also
show how an adversary can exploit our metric to launch
membership inference attacks on individual samples
with high confidence. Finally we perform an in-depth
investigation of our privacy risk score metric, and its
correlations with model sensitivity, generalization error,
and feature embeddings.
Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/
inspire-group/membership-inference-evaluation
for the purpose of reproducible research.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we first briefly introduce machine learning
basics and notations. Next, we present existing membership
inference attacks, including black-box attacks and white-box
attacks. Finally, we discuss two state-of-the-art defense meth-
ods: adversarial regularization [29] and MemGuard [19].
2.1 Machine learning basics and notations
Let Fθ :Rd →Rk be a machine learning model with d input
features and k output classes, parameterized by weights θ.
For an example z = (x,y) with the input feature x and the
ground truth label y, the model outputs a prediction vector
over all class labels Fθ(x) with ∑k−1i=0 Fθ(x)i = 1, and the final
classification result will be the label with the largest prediction
probability yˆ = argmaxi Fθ(x)i.
Given a training set Dtr, the model weights are optimized
by minimizing the prediction loss over all training examples.
min
θ
1
|Dtr| ∑z∈Dtr
`(Fθ,z), (1)
where |Dtr| denotes the size of training set, and ` computes
the prediction loss, such as cross-entropy loss [11]. In this
paper, we skip the model parameter θ for simplicity and use
F to denote the machine learning model.
2.2 Membership inference attacks
For a target machine learning model, membership inference
attacks aim to determine whether a given data point was used
to train the model or not [23, 36, 39, 47]. The attack poses a
serious privacy risk to the individuals whose data is used for
model training, for example in the setting of health analytics.
2.2.1 Black-box membership inference attacks
Shokri et al. [39] investigated the membership inference at-
tacks against machine learning models in the black-box set-
ting. For an input sample z = (x,y) to the target model F ,
the adversary only observes the prediction output F(x) and
infers if z belongs to the model’s training set Dtr. To distin-
guish between target model’s predictions on members and
non-members, the adversary learns an attack model using the
shadow training technique: (1) the adversary first trains mul-
tiple shadow models to simulate the behavior of the target
model; (2) based on shadow models’ outputs on their own
training and test examples, the adversary obtains a labeled
(member vs non-member) dataset, and (3) finally trains multi-
ple neural network (NN) classifiers, one for each class label,
to perform inference attacks against the target model.
Salem et al. [36] show that even with only a single shadow
model, membership inference attacks are still quite successful.
Furthermore, in the case where the adversary knows a subset
of target model’s training set and test set, the attack classifier
can be directly trained with target model’s predictions on
those known samples, and then tested on unknown training
and test sample [29, 30]. Nasr et al. [29] redesign the attack
by using one-hot encoded class labels as part of input features
and training a single NN attack classifier for all class labels.
Besides membership inference attacks that rely on training
NN classifiers, there are non-NN based attack methods that
make inference decisions based on computing custom metrics
on the predictions of the target model. Leino et al. [22] suggest
using the metric of prediction correctness as a sign of being
a member or not. Yeom et al. [47] and Song et al. [42] find
that the metric of prediction confidence of correct label F(x)y
can be compared with a certain threshold value to achieve
similar attack performance as NN-based attacks. Shokri et
al. [39] show a large divergence between prediction entropy
distributions over training data and test data, although this
metric was not explicitly used for attacks.
Despite the existence of such non-NN based attacks, many
research papers [19,29,30] still only train NN attack classifiers
to evaluate target models’ privacy risks. We find that this
can lead to severe underestimation of privacy risks by re-
evaluating the same target models with non-NN based attacks.
Furthermore, we improve existing non-NN based attacks by
setting different threshold values for different class labels,
building upon the motivation of separated attack classifiers
for each class label by Shokri et al. [39]. We also propose
a new inference attack method by considering ground truth
label when evaluating prediction uncertainty.
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2.2.2 White-box membership inference attacks
Nasr et al. [30] analyze membership inference attacks in the
white-box setting, where the adversary has the full access
to the target machine learning model and knows the model
architecture and model parameters. They find that simply com-
bining target model’s final predictions and its intermediate
computations to learn the attack classifier results in attack
accuracy no better than that of the corresponding black-box
attacks. Instead, by using the gradient of prediction loss with
regard to model parameters ∂`(Fθ,z)∂θ as additional features, the
white-box membership inference attacks obtain higher attack
accuracy than the black-box attacks. We show that the gap
between white-box attack accuracy and black-box attack ac-
curacy is much smaller than previous estimates in this paper.
2.3 Defenses against membership inference at-
tacks
To mitigate the risks of membership inference attacks, sev-
eral defense ideas have been proposed. L2 norm regulariza-
tion [21] and dropout [43] are standard techniques for reduc-
ing overfitting in machine learning. They are also shown to de-
crease privacy risks to some degree [36, 39]. However, target
models can still be quite vulnerable after applying these tech-
niques. Differential privacy [8] can also be applied to machine
learning models for provable risk mitigation [1, 27, 31, 38],
however, it induces significant accuracy drop for desired val-
ues of the privacy parameter [18]. Two dedicated defenses,
adversarial regularization [30] and MemGuard [19], were re-
cently proposed against membership inference attacks. Both
defenses are reported to have the ability of decreasing the
attack accuracy to around 50%, which is the performance of
random guessing. We explain their details below.
2.3.1 Adversarial regularization [29]
Nasr et al. [29] propose to include the membership inference
adversary with the NN-based attack into the training process
itself to mitigate privacy risks. At each training step, the attack
classifier is first updated to distinguish between training data
(members) and validation data (non-members), and then the
target classifier is updated to simultaneously minimize the
prediction loss and mislead the attack classifier.
More specifically, to train the classifier F with parameters
θ in a manner that is resilient against membership inference
attacks, Nasr et al. [29] use another classifier I with parame-
ters ϑ to perform membership inference attacks. The attack
classifier I takes the target model’s prediction F(x) and the
input label y as input features and generate one single output
I(F(x),y), which is in the range [0, 1]. It infers the input sam-
ple as a member if the output is larger than 0.5, a non-member
otherwise. At each training step, they first update the attack
classifier I by maximizing the membership inference gain
over the training set Dtr and the validation set Dval.
argmax
ϑ
∑z∈Dtr log(I(F(x),y))
2|Dtr| +
∑z∈Dval log(1− I(F(x),y))
2|Dval|
(2)
They further train the target classifier by minimizing both
model prediction loss and membership inference gain over
the training set Dtr.
argmin
θ
1
|Dtr| ∑z∈Dtr
`(F(x),y)+λ log(I(F(x),y)), (3)
where λ is a penalty parameter for the privacy risk. In this way,
the target model F is trained with an additional regularization
term to defend against membership inference attacks.
2.3.2 MemGuard [19]
Jia et al. [19] propose MemGuard as a defense method against
membership inference attacks, which, different from Nasr et
al. [29], does not need to modify the training process. Instead,
given a pre-trained target model F , they obfuscate its predic-
tions with well-designed noises to confuse the membership
inference classifier I, without changing classification results.
The attack classifier I is trained following the shadow-
training technique [39], which takes the model prediction
F(x) with the sample label y, and outputs a score I(F(x),y)
in the range [0 ,1] for membership inference: if the output is
larger than 0.5, the data sample is inferred as a member, and
vice versa. The key question of how to add noise n to F(x)
can be formulated as the following optimization problem:
min
n
d(F(x)+n,F(x)),
subject to:argmax
i
(F(x)i +ni) = argmax
i
F(x)i,
I(F(x)+n) = 0.5,
F(x)i +ni ≥ 0,∀i
∑
i
ni = 0,
(4)
where the objective is to minimize the distance d between
original predictions and noisy predictions. The first constraint
ensures the classification result does not change after adding
noise, the second constraint ensures the attack classifier can-
not determine whether the sample is a member or a non-
member with the noisy predictions, and last two constraints
ensure the noisy predictions are valid.
When evaluating the defense performance, both Nasr et
al. [29] and Jia et al. [19] train NN classifiers for inference
attacks. As shown in the following section, we find that their
evaluations underestimate privacy risks. With our benchmark
attacks, the adversary achieves significantly higher attack
accuracy on defended models than previous estimates. We
further find that the performance of adversarial regulariza-
tion [29] is no better than early stopping, and the evaluation of
MemGuard [19] lacks consideration of strategic adversaries.
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3 Systematically Evaluating Membership In-
ference Privacy Risks
In this section, we first present a suite of non-NN based attacks
to benchmark privacy risks, which only need to observe target
model’s output predictions (i.e., black-box setting). Next, we
provide two recommendations, comparison with early stop-
ping and considering adaptive attacks, to rigorously measure
the effectiveness of defense approaches. Finally, we present
experiment results by re-evaluating target models in prior
work [19, 29, 30] with our proposed benchmark attacks.
3.1 Benchmarks of membership inference at-
tacks
We propose to use a suite of non-NN based attack methods to
benchmark membership inference privacy risks of machine
learning models. We call these attack methods “metric-based
attacks” as they first measure the performance metrics of tar-
get model’s predictions, such as correctness, confidence, and
entropy, and then compare those metrics with certain thresh-
old values to infer whether the input sample is a member or
a non-member [22, 42]. We improve existing metric-based
attacks by setting different threshold values for different class
labels of target models. Then we propose another new metric-
based attack by considering ground truth label when evaluat-
ing prediction uncertainty. We denote the inference strategy as
I , which codes members as 1, and non-members as 0. Overall,
we argue that existing NN based attacks should be supple-
mented with our metric-based attacks for systematically and
rigorously evaluating privacy risks of ML models.
3.1.1 Existing attacks
Inference attack based on prediction correctness Leino et
al [22] and Yeom et al. [48] observe that the membership
inference attacks based on whether the input is classified
correctly or not achieve comparable success as NN-based
attack on target models with large generalization errors. The
intuition is that the target model is trained to predict correctly
on training data (members), which may not generalize well on
test data (non-members). Thus, we can rely on the prediction
correctness metric for membership inference. The adversary
infers an input sample as a member if it is correctly predicted,
a non-member otherwise.
Icorr(F,(x,y)) = 1{argmax
i
F(x)i = y}, (5)
where 1{·} is the indicator function.
3.1.2 Improving existing attacks with class-dependent
thresholds
Inference attack based on prediction confidence Yeom et
al. [47] and Song et al. [42] show that the attack strategy
of using a threshold on the prediction confidence results in
similar attack accuracy as NN-based attacks. The intuition is
that the target model is trained by minimizing prediction loss
over training data, which means the prediction confidence of
a training sample F(x)y should be close to 1. On the other
hand, the model is usually less confident in predictions on
a test sample. Thus, we can rely on the metric of prediction
confidence for membership inference. The adversary infers
an input example as a member if its prediction confidence is
larger than a preset threshold, a non-member otherwise.
Iconf(F,(x,y)) = 1{F(x)y ≥ τy}. (6)
Yeom et al. [47] and Song et al. [42] choose to use a sin-
gle threshold for all class labels. We improve this method
by setting different threshold values τy for different class la-
bels y. The reason is that the dataset may be unbalanced
so that the target model indeed has different confidence lev-
els for different class labels. Our experiments show that this
class-dependent thresholding technique leads to better attack
performance. The threshold values τy are learned with the
shadow-training technique [39] by distinguishing between
shadow training data and shadow test data.
Inference attack based on prediction entropy Although
there is no prior work using prediction entropy for member-
ship inference attacks, Shokri et al. [39] indeed present the
difference of prediction entropy distributions between train-
ing and test data to explain why privacy risks exist. Salem
et al. [36] also mention the possibility of using prediction
entropy for attacks. The intuition is that the target model is
trained by minimizing the prediction loss over training data,
which means the prediction output of a training sample should
be close to a one-hot encoded vector and its prediction entropy
should be close to 0. On the other hand, the target model usu-
ally has a larger prediction entropy on an unseen test sample.
Therefore, we can rely on the metric of prediction entropy
for membership inference. The adversary classifies an input
example as a member if its prediction entropy is smaller than
a preset threshold, a non-member otherwise.
Ientr(F,(x,y)) = 1{−∑
i
F(x)i log(F(x)i)≤ τˆy}. (7)
Similar to the confidence-based attack, we propose to use the
threshold values τˆy that are dependent on the class labels and
are set with the shadow-training technique [39].
3.1.3 Our new inference attack based on modified pre-
diction entropy
The attack based on prediction entropy has one serious issue:
it does not contain any information about the ground truth
label. In fact, both a correct classification with probability of
1 and a totally wrong classification with probability of 1 lead
to zero prediction entropy values.
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Figure 2: Intuition for three mathematical functions: y =
−x logx, y =−(1− x) logx, and y =−x log(1− x).
To resolve this issue, we design a new metric with following
two properties to measure the model prediction uncertainty
given the ground truth label: it should be (1) monotonically
decreasing with the prediction probability of the correct label
F(x)y, and (2) monotonically increasing with the prediction
probability of any incorrect label F(x)i,∀i 6= y. From Fig-
ure 2, we can see that the function used in entropy computa-
tions −x logx is not a monotonic function, −(1− x) logx is
a monotonically decreasing function, and −x log(1− x) is a
monotonically increasing function. Therefore, we propose the
modified prediction entropy metric, computed as follows.
Mentr(F(x),y) =− (1−F(x)y) log(F(x)y)
−∑
i 6=y
F(x)i log(1−F(x)i). (8)
In this way, a correct classification with probability of 1 leads
to modified entropy of 0, while a wrong classification with
probability of 1 leads to modified entropy of infinity.
Now, with the new metric of modified prediction entropy,
the adversary classifies an input example as a member if its
modified prediction entropy is smaller than a preset threshold,
a non-member otherwise.
IMentr(F,(x,y)) = 1{Mentr(F(x),y)≤ τˇy}. (9)
Similar to previous scenarios, we set different threshold values
τˇy for different class labels, which are learned with the shadow
training technique [39]. Experiments show that the inference
attack based on our modified prediction entropy is strictly
superior to the inference attack based on prediction entropy.
3.2 Rigorously evaluating membership infer-
ence defenses
To evaluate the effectiveness of defenses against membership
inference attacks, we make the following two recommenda-
tions, besides using our metric-based benchmark attacks.
3.2.1 Comparison with early stopping
During the training process, the target model’s parameters
are updated following gradient descent methods, so the train-
ing error and test error usually get reduced gradually with
an increasing number of training epochs. However, as the
number of training epochs increases, the target model also
becomes more vulnerable to membership inference attacks,
due to increased memorization. We thus propose early stop-
ping [6, 32, 46] as a benchmark defense method, in which
fewer training epochs are used in order to tradeoff a slight
reduction in model accuracy with lower privacy risk.
Figure 3: Test accuracy at different training epochs for Pur-
chase100 classifiers without defense and with adversarial
regularization defense [29]. We should compare the final de-
fended model to the model with early stopping.
We recommend that whenever a defense method is pro-
posed in the literature that reduces the threat of membership
inference attacks at the cost of degradation in model accu-
racy, the performance of the defense method should be bench-
marked against our early stopping approach. This is indeed the
case for the defense method of adversarial regularization (Ad-
vReg) [29]. As shown in Figure 3, the defended Purchase100
classifier should be compared to the undefended model with
fewer training steps and similar accuracy.
3.2.2 Adaptive attacks
There always exists an arms race between privacy attacks and
defenses for machine learning models. When evaluating the
defense performance, it is critical to put the adversary into
the last step, i.e., the adversary knows the defense mechanism
and performs adaptive attacks against the defended models. A
perfect defense performance with non-adaptive attacks does
not mean that the defense approach is effective [2, 5, 13].
Specifically for defenses proposed against membership in-
ference attacks, we should consider that the adversary knows
the defense mechanism such that he or she can train shadow
models following the defense method. From these defended
shadow models, the adversary then learns an attacks classifier
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or sets threshold values for metric-based attacks, and finally
performs attacks on the defended target model.
3.3 Experiment results
We first re-evaluate the effectiveness of two membership in-
ference defenses [19, 29], and then re-evaluate the white-box
membership inference attacks proposed by Nasr et al. [30].
Following prior work [39,42], we sample the input (x,y) from
either the target model’s training set or test set with an equal
50% probability. Thus, the random guessing strategy results
in a 50% membership inference attack accuracy.
3.3.1 Datasets
Purchase100 This dataset is based on Kaggle’s Acquire Val-
ued Shoppers Challenge,1 which contains shopping records
of several thousand individuals. We obtain a simplified and
preprocessed purchase dataset provided by Shokri et al. [39].
The dataset has 197,324 data samples with 600 binary fea-
tures. Each feature corresponds to a product and represents
whether the individual has purchased it or not. All data sam-
ples are clustered into 100 classes representing different pur-
chase styles. The classification task is to predict the purchase
style based on the 600 binary features. We follow Nasr et
al. [29,30] to use 10% data samples (19,732) to train a model.
Texas100 This dataset is based on the Hospital Discharge
Data public use files with patients’ information released by
the Texas Department of State Health Services.2 Each data
record contains the external causes of injury (e.g., suicide,
drug misuse), the diagnosis (e.g., schizophrenia), the proce-
dures the patient underwent (e.g., surgery) and some generic
information (e.g., gender, age, race). We obtain a simplified
and preprocessed Texas dataset provided by Shokri et al. [39].
The classification task is to predict the patient’s main proce-
dure based on the patient’s information. The dataset focuses
on 100 most frequent procedures, resulting in 67,330 data
samples with 6,170 binary features. Following previous pa-
pers [19,29,30], we use 10,000 data samples to train a model.
Location30 This dataset is based on Foursquare dataset,3
which contains location “check-in” records of several thou-
sand individuals. We obtain a simplified and preprocessed
Location dataset provided by Shokri et al. [39]. The dataset
contains 5,010 data samples with with 446 binary features.
Each feature corresponds to a certain region or location
type and represents whether the individual has visited the
region/location or not. All data samples are clustered into 30
classes representing different geosocial types. The classifi-
cation task is to predict the geosocial type based on the 466
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge
2https://www.dshs.texas.gov/THCIC/Hospitals/Download.
shtm
3https://sites.google.com/site/yangdingqi/home/
foursquare-dataset
binary features. Following Jia et al. [19], we use 1,000 data
samples to train a model.
CIFAR100 This is a major benchmark dataset for image clas-
sification [20]. It is composed of 32×32 color images in 100
classes, with 600 images per class. For each class label, 500
images are used as training samples, and the remaining 100
images are used as test samples.
3.3.2 Re-evaluating adversarial regularization [29]
We follow Nasr et al. [29] to train both defended and unde-
fended classifiers on Purchase100 and Texas100 datasets. For
both datasets, the model architecture is a fully connected neu-
ral network with 4 hidden layers. The numbers of neurons
for hidden layers are 1024, 512, 256, and 128, respectively.
We note that the defense method of adversarial regulariza-
tion [29] incurs accuracy drop. After applying the defense,
the test accuracy drops from 80.9% to 76.6% on the Pur-
chase100 dataset, and from 52.3% to 46.4% on the Texas100
dataset. As we discuss in Section 3.2.1, to further evaluate the
effectiveness of adversarial regularization [29], we also obtain
models with early stopping by saving the undefended models
in every training epoch and picking the saved epochs with
similar accuracy performance as defended models. Table 2
presents the membership inference attack results.
From Table 2, we can see that the defended models are
still vulnerable to membership inference attacks, indicat-
ing the necessity of our metric-based benchmark attacks. We
achieve 59.5% and 58.6% attack accuracy on the defended
Purchase100 classifier and the defended Texas100 classifier
with our benchmark attacks, significantly larger than 51.6%
and 51.0% as reported by Nasr et al. [29]. Furthermore, on
all models except the undefended Purchase100 classifier, the
largest attack accuracy achieved by benchmark attacks is
larger than that of NN based attacks used in Nasr et al. [29].
Note that the defense method provides limited mitigation of
privacy risks: it reduces attack accuracy from around 67%
to around 59% on tested models. We also find that our new
attack based on the modified entropy (IMentr) always out-
performs the conventional entropy based attack (Ientr). It
is also very competitive among all benchmark attacks.
From Table 2, we also surprisingly find that adversarial
regularization [29] is no better than our early stopping
benchmark method: with early stopping, the undefended
Purchase100 classifier and the undefended Texas100 classifier
have the membership inference accuracy of 59.2% and 59.5%,
which are quite close to those of defended models.
To show the attack improvement yielded by our class-
dependent thresholding technique, we compare with metric-
based attacks when the same threshold is applied to all class
labels. Table 3 shows the results on Texas100 classifiers with-
out defense, with AdvReg [29], and with early stopping. We
can see that with the class-dependent thresholding tech-
nique, we increase the attack accuracy by 1% – 4%.
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Table 2: Benchmarking the effectiveness of using adversary regularization [29] as defense against membership inference attacks.
We can see that the defended models are still vulnerable to membership inference attacks.
Model Performance Membership Inference Attacks
dataset using training test attack acc attack acc attack acc attack acc attack accdefense [29]? acc acc by [29] (Icorr) (Iconf) (Ientr) (IMentr)
Purchase100 no 99.8% 80.9% 67.6% 59.5% 67.1% 65.7% 67.1%
Purchase100 yes 92.7% 76.6% 51.6% 58.1% 59.4% 55.8% 59.5%
Purchase100 early stopping 92.9% 76.4% N.A. 58.2% 59.2% 55.9% 59.1%
Texas100 no 81.0% 52.3% 63.0% 64.4% 67.8% 60.2% 67.7%
Texas100 yes 56.6% 46.4% 51.0% 55.1% 58.6% 53.5% 58.6%
Texas100 early stopping 59.3% 47.9% N.A. 55.7% 59.4% 54.0% 59.5%
Table 3: Comparing attack performance between conven-
tional class-independent thresholding attacks and our class-
dependent thresholding attacks.
attack methods defense methods for Texas100 classifierno defense AdvReg [29] early stopping
Iconf 64.7% 55.5% 55.8%(class-independent)
Iconf 67.8% 58.6% 59.4%(class-dependent)
Ientr 58.3% 52.9% 53.2%(class-independent)
Ientr 60.2% 53.5% 54.0%(class-dependent)
IMentr 64.8% 55.4% 55.9%(class-independent)
IMentr 67.7% 58.6% 59.5%(class-dependent)
3.3.3 Re-evaluating MemGuard [19]
We follow Jia et al. [19] to train classifiers on Location30 and
Texas100 datasets. For both datasets, the model architecture
is a fully connected neural network with 4 hidden layers. The
numbers of neurons for hidden layers are 1024, 512, 256, and
128, respectively. MemGuard [19] does not change the ac-
curacy performance, so the comparison with early stopping
benchmark is not applicable. Table 4 lists the attack accuracy
on both undefended and defended models, with attack meth-
ods in Jia et al. [19] and our metric-based benchmark attack
methods. In fact, Jia et al. [19] use 6 different neural network
attack classifiers to measure the privacy risks, and we pick
the highest attack accuracy among them.
From Table 4, we again emphasize the necessity of our
benchmark attacks by showing that the defended models
still have high membership inference accuracy: 69.1% on
the defended Location30 classifier and 74.2% on the defended
Texas100 classifier, much larger than 50.1% and 50.3% re-
ported by Jia et al. [19]. We even achieve higher member-
ship inference accuracy than attacks in Jia et al. [19] on
all models, except the undefended Location30 classifier. Note
that the defense idea still works but to a limited degree: it
reduces the membership inference accuracy by 12% on the
Location30 classifier and by 5% on the Texas100 classifier.
Similar to Section 3.3.2, our proposed modified-entropy
based attack always achieves higher attack accuracy than
the entropy based attack, and is very competitive among
all benchmark attacks.
Next, we discuss why Jia et al. [19] fail to achieve high
membership inference accuracy for their defended models.
We find that most of their attacks (4 out of 6) are non-adaptive
attacks, where the adversary has no idea of the implemented
defense, and thus the membership inference attacks are not
successful. For the two adaptive attacks, Jia et al. [19] do
not put the adversary in the last step of the arms race be-
tween attacks and defenses. In their attacks, the adversary
is aware that the model predictions will be perturbed with
noises but does not know the exact algorithm of noise gen-
eration implemented by the defender. In their first adaptive
attack, Jia et al. [19] round the model predictions to be one
decimal during the attack classifier’s inference to mitigate the
effect of the perturbation. However, the attack performance
is greatly degraded when the applied perturbation is large.
In the second adaptive attack, Jia et al. [19] train the attack
classifier using the state-of-the-art robust training algorithm
by Madry et al. [26], with the hope that noisy perturbation
will not change the classification. However, the robust train-
ing algorithm [26] has a very poor generalization property:
the predictions on test points are still likely to be wrong after
adding well-designed noises. For a thorough evaluation of
the defense, we should consider that the attacker has the full
knowledge of the defense mechanism, and he or she learns
the attack model based on the defended shadow models.
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Table 4: Benchmarking the effectiveness of using MemGuard [19] as defense against membership inference attacks. We can see
that the defended models are still vulnerable to membership inference attacks.
Model Performance Membership Inference Attacks
dataset using training test attack acc attack acc attack acc attack acc attack accdefense [19]? acc acc by [19] (Icorr) (Iconf) (Ientr) (IMentr)
Location30 no 100% 60.7% 81.1% 68.7% 76.3% 61.6% 78.1%
Location30 yes 100% 60.7% 50.1% 68.7% 69.1% 52.1% 68.8%
Texas100 no 99.95% 51.77% 74.0% 74.2% 79.0% 66.6% 79.4%
Texas100 yes 99.95% 51.77% 50.3% 74.2% 74.1% 54.6% 74.0%
Table 5: Benchmarking the effectiveness of white-box membership inference attacks proposed by Nasr et al. [30]. We can see
that compared with our black-box benchmark attacks, the advantage of white-box attacks is limited.
Model Performance Membership Inference Attacks
dataset training test attack acc attack acc attack acc attack acc attack acc attack accacc acc by [30] (white-box) by [30] (black-box) (Icorr) (Iconf) (Ientr) (IMentr)
Purchase100 99.8% 80.9% 73.4% 67.6% 59.5% 67.1% 65.7% 67.1%
Texas100 81.0% 52.3% 68.3% 63.0% 64.4% 67.8% 60.2% 67.7%
CIFAR100 100% 83.00% 74.3% 67.7% 58.5% 73.7% 73.3% 73.6%
3.3.4 Re-evaluating white-box membership inference
attacks [30]
We have shown that previous work may underestimate the
target models’ privacy risks, and the metric-based attacks with
only black-box access can result in higher attack accuracy
than NN based attacks for most models. Recently Nasr et
al. [30] demonstrated that a white-box membership inference
adversary can perform stronger NN based attacks by using
gradient with regard to model parameters. Next, we evaluate
whether the advantage of white-box attacks still exists by
using our metric-based black-box benchmark attacks.
We follow Nasr et al. [30] to obtain classifiers on
Purchase100, Texas100 and CIFAR100 datasets. The Pur-
chase100 classifier and the Texas100 classifier are same as
undefended classifiers in Nasr et al. [29]. The CIFAR100
classifier is a publicly available pre-trained model,4 with the
DenseNet architecture [16, 17]. Table 5 lists all attack results.
From Table 5, we can see that compared to the black-
box metric-based attacks, the improvement of white-box
membership inference attacks is limited. The attack accu-
racy of white-box membership inference adversary is only
0.5% and 0.6% higher than the attack accuracy achieved by
our black-box benchmark attacks, on the Texas100 and the CI-
FAR100 classifiers. The white-box attack on the Purchase100
classifier still has 5.8% increase in attack accuracy compared
4https://github.com/bearpaw/pytorch-classification
to black-box attacks. As a validation of our observations, we
note that Shejwalkar and Houmansadr also report close mem-
bership inference attack accuracy between white-box attacks
and black-box attacks in their recent work [37].
4 Fine-Grained Analysis on Privacy Risks
Prior work [19, 29, 30, 39, 41] focuses on an aggregate evalua-
tion of privacy risks by reporting overall attack accuracy or
a precision-recall pair, which are averaged over all samples.
However, the target machine learning model’s performance is
usually varied across samples, which denotes the heterogene-
ity of samples’ privacy risks. Therefore, a fine-grained privacy
risk analysis of individual samples is needed, with which we
can understand the distribution of privacy risks over samples.
In this section, we first define a metric called privacy risk
score to quantitatively measure the privacy risks for each
individual training member. Then we use this metric to exper-
imentally measure fine-grained privacy risks of target models.
Overall, we argue that existing aggregate privacy analysis of
ML models should be supplemented with our fine-grained
privacy analysis for a thorough evaluation of privacy risks.
4.1 Definition of privacy risk score
For membership inference attacks, the privacy risk of a train-
ing member arises due to the distinguishability of its model
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prediction with non-members. This motivates our definition
of the privacy risk score as following.
Definition 1 The privacy risk score of an input sample z =
(x,y) for the target machine learning model F is defined as
the posterior probability that it is from the training set Dtr
after observing the target model’s prediction F(x), i.e.,
r(z) = P(z ∈ Dtr|F(x)) (10)
Based on Bayes’ theorem, we further compute the privacy
risk score as following.
r(z) =
P(z ∈ Dtr) ·P(F(x)|z ∈ Dtr)
P(F(x))
=
P(z ∈ Dtr) ·P(F(x)|z ∈ Dtr)
P(z ∈ Dtr) ·P(F(x)|z ∈ Dtr)+P(z ∈ Dte) ·P(F(x)|z ∈ Dte)
=
P(F(x)|z ∈ Dtr)
P(F(x)|z ∈ Dtr)+P(F(x)|z ∈ Dte)
(11)
The last equation is derived assuming that an example is
sampled from either training set or test set with equal 50%
probability.
From Equation (11), we can see that the risk score depends
on the output distributions on both training and test data. Since
it is difficult to exactly compute the multi-dimension distri-
butions P(F(x)|z ∈Dtr) and P(F(x)|z ∈Dte), we can instead
approximate the computation by leveraging prediction met-
rics, such as confidence and modified entropy, and compute
one-dimensional distributions for these metrics. Based on the
results in Section 3.3, among all benchmark attacks, using
modified entropy usually results in highest attack accuracy.5
Thus, we use the distributions of modified prediction entropy
(Equation (8)) to approximate the privacy risk score.
r(z)≈ P(Mentr(F(x),y)|z ∈ Dtr)
P(Mentr(F(x),y)|z ∈ Dtr)+P(Mentr(F(x),y)|z ∈ Dte) ,
(12)
where P(Mentr(F(x),y)|z ∈ Dtr) and P(Mentr(F(x),y)|z ∈
Dte) can be estimated with the shadow classifier on shadow
training and test data.
4.2 Experiment results
In our experiments, we first validate that our proposed privacy
risk score really captures the probability of being a member.
Next, we compare the distributions of training samples’ pri-
vacy risk scores for target models without defense and with
defenses [19, 29]. We then demonstrate how to use privacy
risk scores to perform membership inference attacks with high
5In most cases, both modified entropy based attack and confidence based
attack give best attack performance. However, for undefended Location30 and
Texas100 classifiers in Table 4, the modified entropy based attack achieves
significantly higher attack accuracy.
confidence. Finally, we perform an in-depth investigation of
individual samples’ privacy risk scores by correlating them
with model sensitivity, generalization errors, and feature em-
beddings. To have enough diversity of data and models, and to
further evaluate defense methods, we perform experiments on
3 Purchase100 classifiers (without defense, with AdvReg [29],
and with early stopping) and 2 Texas100 classifiers (without
defense, and with MemGuard [19]).
4.2.1 Validation of privacy risk score
Before presenting the detailed results for privacy risk score,
we first validate its effectiveness here. For the target machine
learning model, we first compute the privacy risk scores with
Equation (12) for all training and test samples. Then we divide
the entire range of privacy risk scores into multiple bins, and
compute the fraction of training points in each bin. If the
privacy risk score truly corresponds to the probability that a
sample is from a target model’s training set, then we expect
the actual values of privacy risk scores and fraction of training
points in each bin to close track with each other.
As a baseline to compare with, we also consider using NN
based attacks to estimate privacy risks of individual samples.
Prior papers suggest using the attack classifier’s prediction to
measure the input’s privacy risk [19, 29]. The attack classifier
has only one output, which is within [0, 1] and can serve as
a proxy to estimate the probability of being a member. Fol-
lowing same steps as above, we compute the real probability
of being a member and the averaged outputs of the attack
classifier. Specifically, we follow Nasr et al. [29] to train the
attack classifier by using the target model’s predictions and
one-hot encoded input labels as features.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of training samples’ pri-
vacy risk scores (top row) and attack classifier’s outputs on
training data (bottom row) for Purchase100 classifiers with-
out defense, with AdvReg [29], and with early stopping. We
also compare the privacy risk score and attack classifier’s
output with the real probability of an input being a member,
as shown in the last column of Figure 4 where the ideal case
is used to check the effectiveness of metrics. We can see that
our proposed privacy risk score closely aligns with the ac-
tual probability of being a member: the privacy risk score
curves for all three models are quite close to the line of the
ideal case. On the other hand, the attack classifiers’ outputs
fail to capture the membership probability. This is because
the NN classifiers are trained to minimize the loss, i.e., the
output of a member should be close to 1 while the output of a
non-member should be close to 0. With this training goal, the
obtained attack classifiers failed to capture the privacy risks
for individual samples. We also quantitatively measure the
root-mean-square error (RMSE) between estimated probabil-
ity of member and real probability of member. On the three
Purchase100 classifiers, the RMSE values of our privacy risk
score are 0.05, 0.09, and 0.06; in contrast, the RMSE values of
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(a) The first three figures present the distributions of training samples’ privacy risk scores on Purchase100 classifiers without defense, with
AdvReg [29], and with early stoppping. The last figure shows that the privacy risk score can well represent the real probability of being a
member, with root mean square error (RMSE) of 0.05, 0.09, and 0.06.
(b) The first three figures present the distributions of NN attack classifier’s outputs on Purchase100 classifiers without defense, with AdvReg [29],
and with early stoppping. The last figure shows that the NN classifier’s output fails to represent the real probability of being a member, with
RMSE values of 0.26, 0.26, and 0.25.
Figure 4: Estimate the probability of being a member with our proposed privacy risk score (Figure 4a), and with the NN attack
classifier’s output (Figure 4b).
NN classifier’s outputs are 0.26, 0.26, 0.25, respectively. We
observe similar results on the undefended Texas100 classifier
and the defended classifier by MemGuard [19], with detailed
results in Appendix A.
4.2.2 Heterogeneity of members’ privacy risk scores
After validating the effectiveness of the privacy risk score met-
ric, we show the heterogeneity of training samples’ privacy
risks by plotting the cumulative distribution of their privacy
risk scores. We also investigate the performance of mem-
bership inference defense methods [19, 29] with comparison
between defended and undefended classifiers.
Figure 5: The cumulative distribution of privacy risk scores
for Purchase100 classifiers in Nasr et al. [29].
Figure 5 presents the cumulative distributions of training
points’ privacy risk scores for Purchase100 classifiers. We
can see that, compared with the undefended Purchase100
classifier, the defended classifier with adversarial regular-
ization [29] has smaller privacy risk scores on average.
However, we can also see that the defended classifier has
a small portion of training data with higher privacy risk
scores than the undefended model: the undefended model
has all members’ privacy risk scores under 0.8, in contrast,
the defended model has several training points with privacy
risk scores higher than 0.8. Furthermore, the classifier with
early stopping has a similar risk score distribution as the
defended classifier.
Figure 6: The cumulative distribution of privacy risk scores
for Texas100 classifiers in Jia et al. [19].
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Figure 6 shows the cumulative distribution of training data’
privacy risk scores for Texas100 classifiers. We can see that
the defense method indeed decreases training samples’
privacy risk scores. However, the defended classifier is
still quite vulnerable: 80% training samples have privacy
risk scores higher than 0.6.
4.2.3 Usage of privacy risk score
From our definition and verification results in Section 4.2.1,
we know that privacy risk score of a data point indicates
its probability of being a member. Instead of pursuing high
attack accuracy, now the membership inference adversary can
perform attacks with high confidence: a sample is inferred
as a member if and only if its privacy risk score is above a
certain probability threshold.
As an example, we show the attack results with precision
and recall values in Table 6 for two Texas100 classifiers with
varying threshold values on privacy risk scores. We do not
discuss Purchase100 classifiers since their most training data
have privacy risk scores below 0.7. From Table 6, we can see
that with larger threshold values on privacy risk scores, the
adversary indeed has higher precision values for membership
inference attacks. We also observe a degree of privacy risk mit-
igation introduced by MemGuard [19]: for the same threshold
value on privacy risk scores, both undefended and defended
models have similar attack precision, but the defended model
has a smaller recall value. However, the defended model still
has severe privacy risks: 70.5% training members can be
inferred correctly with the precision of 71.3%.
4.2.4 Impact of model properties on privacy risk score
We perform an in-depth investigation of privacy risk score
by exploring its correlations with certain model properties,
including sensitivity, generalization error, and feature embed-
ding. We use the undefended Texas100 classifier from Jia et
al. [19] for the following experiments.
Privacy risk score with sensitivity We first study the rela-
tionship between privacy risk scores and model sensitivity
with regard to training samples. The sensitivity is defined as
the influence of one training sample on the target model by
computing the difference after removing that training sample.
Since the privacy risk score in Equation (12) is obtained with
the measured distributions of modified prediction entropy
over training set and test set, we compute the model’s sen-
sitivity regard to a training point z = (x,y) as the logarithm
of Mentr(F˜z(x),y)Mentr(F(x),y) , where F˜z means the retrained classifier after
removing z from the training set.
Figure 7 shows the relation between privacy risk scores
and the model sensitivity. For each privacy risk score, we
show the first quartile, the average, and the third quartile of
model sensitivities with regard to training data. We can see
Figure 7: The relation between privacy risk score and model
sensitivity.
that, samples with higher privacy risk scores are likely to
have a larger influence on the target model.
Privacy risk score with generalization error We observe
that training samples with very high risk scores are typically
concentrated in a few class labels. Therefore, we further com-
pare the privacy risk scores among different class labels in
this section.
Figure 8: Averaged privacy risk score vs generalization error
per class with a strong Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.94.
Besides the privacy risk scores, we also record the gen-
eralization errors for different class labels. Figure 8 shows
the averaged privacy risk scores and generalization errors
for all 100 classes, where we sort the class labels based on
their generalization errors. We can see that the class labels
with high generalization errors tend to have higher pri-
vacy risk scores, which is as expected since the generaliza-
tion error has a large influence on the success of membership
inference attacks [39]. The Pearson correlation coefficient be-
tween averaged privacy risk scores and generalization errors
is as high as 0.94.
Privacy risk score with feature embeddings From the
above experiment, we know that training samples from class
labels with high generalization errors tend to have high pri-
vacy risk scores. Next, we investigate this further by look-
ing into the feature representations of different class labels
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Table 6: Membership inference attacks by setting different threshold values on privacy risk scores. For each threshold value, we
report the (precision, recall) pair of membership inference attacks.
dataset defense threshold values on privacy risk scoresmethod 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Texas100
no defense (85.4%, 21.2%) (83.4%, 29.1%) (81.2%, 45.3%) (77.0%, 66.1%) (72.8%, 85.4%) (70.6%, 94.3%)
MemGuard [19] (88.2%, 1.4%) (84.5%, 7.6%) (82.6%, 18.7%) (77.0%, 43.7%) (71.3%, 70.5%) (66.0%, 99.9%)
(a) t-SNE plot for training samples in 10 class labels. (b) t-SNE plot for test samples in 10 class labels
Figure 9: By using t-SNE [25], we visualize feature embeddings for both training samples and test samples. Training samples in
the first 5 class labels have low privacy risk scores, and training samples in the last 5 class labels have high privacy risk scores.
learned by the target classifier. We use the outputs of last
hidden layer of the target classifier as the feature embedding
of the input sample. We pick the top 5 class labels (30, 93, 97,
18, 98) with lowest average privacy risk scores (0.50, 0.52,
0.53, 0.54, 0.55) and at least 100 training samples, and the
top 5 class labels (72, 49, 45, 51, 78) with highest averaged
privacy risk scores (0.82, 0.83, 0.83, 0.85, 0.90) and at least
100 training samples. We record feature embeddings for both
training and test examples from these 10 class labels. Finally,
we adopt the t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-
SNE) [24,25], a nonlinear dimensionality reduction technique,
to visualize the feature embeddings.
Figure 9a and Figure 9b show the t-SNE plots of training
samples and test samples, respectively. The training samples
are separated clearly based on class labels since the target
classifier has the training accuracy close to 100%. Test sam-
ples from class labels with low risk scores have quite similar
feature embeddings as training samples and are still well sep-
arated. On the other hand, test samples from class labels
with high risk scores exhibit differences in feature repre-
sentations compared to corresponding training samples.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we first argue that measuring membership in-
ference privacy risks with neural network based attacks is
insufficient. We propose to use a suite of metric-based attacks,
including existing methods with our improved class-specific
thresholds and a new proposed method based on modified pre-
diction entropy, for benchmarking privacy risks of machine
learning models. We also make recommendations of compar-
ing with early stopping when benchmarking a defense that
introduces a tradeoff between model accuracy and privacy
risks, and considering adaptive attackers with knowledge of
the defense to rigorously evaluate the performance of defense
approaches. With these benchmark attacks, we show that (1)
the defense approach of adversarial regularization, proposed
by Nasr et al. [29], only reduces privacy risks to a limited
degree and is no better than early stopping; (2) the defense
performance of MemGuard, proposed by Jia et al. [19], is
greatly degraded with adaptive attacks.
Next, we introduce a new metric called the privacy risk
score for a fine-grained analysis of individual samples’ pri-
vacy risks. We show the effectiveness of the privacy risk score
in estimating the true likelihood of an individual sample being
in the training set and observe the heterogeneity of samples’
privacy risk scores with experimental results. Finally, we per-
form an in-depth investigation about the correlation between
privacy risks and model properties, including sensitivity, gen-
eralization error, and feature embeddings. We hope that our
work convinces the research community about the importance
of systematically and rigorously evaluating privacy risks of
machine learning models.
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A Validation of privacy risk score on
Texas100 classifiers
We validate the effectiveness of privacy risk score on the
undefended Texas100 classifier and its defended version with
MemGuard [19], as shown in Figure 10. Compared with the
output of neural network attacks, our proposed privacy risk
score is more meaningful for indicating the real probability of
an input being a member. The RMSE values with our privacy
risk score are 0.08 and 0.05, while the RMSE values with NN
classifier outputs are 0.13 and 0.21, for the undefended and
defended Texas100 classifiers.
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(a) The first two figures present the distributions of training samples’ privacy risk scores on the undefended and the defended Texas100
classifiers [19]. The last figure shows that the privacy risk score can well represent the real probability of being a member, with Root-mean-square
errors (RMSE) of 0.08 and 0.05.
(b) The first two figures present the distributions of NN attack classifier’s outputs on the undefended and the defended Texas100 classifiers [19].
The last figure shows that the NN classifier’s output fails to represent the real probability of being a member, with RMSE values of 0.13 and
0.21.
Figure 10: Estimate the real probability of being a member by using our proposed privacy risk score and using the output of the
NN attack classifier.
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